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Abstract
It is well known that apps running on mobile devices
extensively track and leak users’ personally identifiable
information (PII); however, these users have little
visibility into PII leaked through the network traffic
generated by their devices, and have poor control
over how, when and where that traffic is sent and
handled by third parties. In this paper, we present
the design, implementation, and evaluation of ReCon:
a cross-platform system that reveals PII leaks and
gives users control over them without requiring any
special privileges or custom OSes. ReCon leverages
machine learning to reveal potential PII leaks by
inspecting network traffic, and provides a visualization
tool to empower users with the ability to control
these leaks via blocking or substitution of PII. We
evaluate ReCon’s effectiveness with measurements from
controlled experiments using leaks from the 100 most
popular iOS, Android, and Windows Phone apps, and
via an IRB-approved user study with 92 participants. We
show that ReCon is accurate, efficient, and identifies a
wider range of PII than previous approaches.
1 Introduction
There has been a dramatic shift toward using mobile
devices such as smartphones and tablets as the primary
interface to access Internet services. Unlike their fixed-
line counterparts, these devices also offer ubiquitous
mobile connectivity and are equipped with a wide array
of sensors (e.g., GPS, camera, and microphone).
This combination of rich sensors and ubiquitous
connectivity makes these devices perfect candidates for
privacy invasion. Apps extensively track users and leak
their personally identifiable information (PII) [17, 23,
∗This document contains light modifications to our MobiSys 2016
version [51]. It includes changes to the layout and additional
references.
27, 34, 57], and users are generally unaware and unable
to stop them [21, 29]. Cases of PII leaks dramatically
increased from 13.45% of apps in 2010 to 49.78% of
apps in 2014, and the vast majority of these leaks occur
over IP networks (less than 1% of apps leak data over
SMS) [43].
Previous attempts to address PII leaks face challenges
of a lack of visibility into network traffic generated by
mobile devices and the inability to control the traffic.
Passively gathered datasets from large mobile ISPs [57,
59] provide visibility but give users no control over
network flows. Likewise, custom Android extensions
that are often integrated in dynamic analysis tools
provide control over network flows but measurement
visibility is limited to the devices running these custom
OSes or apps [24], often requiring warranty-voiding
“jailbreaking.” Static analysis tools can identify PII leaks
based on the content of the code implementing an app,
but suffer from imprecision and cannot defend against
dynamic code loading at run time.
We argue that improving mobile privacy requires
(1) trusted third-party systems that enable auditing
and control over PII leaks, and (2) a way for such
auditors to identify PII leaks. Our key observation
is that a PII leak must (by definition) occur over the
network, so interposing on network traffic is a naturally
platform-independent way to detect and mitigate PII
leaks. Based on this insight, we propose a simpler, more
effective strategy than previous approaches: interposing
on network traffic to improve visibility and control for
PII leaks.
Using this approach, we focus on the problem of
identifying and mitigating PII leaks at the network
level. We describe the design and implementation
of a system to address this problem called ReCon,
which detects PII leaks from network flows alone,
presents this information to users, and allows users fine-
grained control over which information is sent to third
parties. We use machine learning and crowdsourcing-
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based reinforcement to build classifiers that reliably
detect PII in network flows, even when we do not
know a priori what information is leaked and in what
format. To address flows using SSL or obfuscation, we
describe techniques that allow our system to detect PII
leaks in encrypted flows with user opt in, and adapt to
obfuscation.1
By operating on network traffic alone, ReCon can be
deployed in mobile networks [4], in home networks, in
the cloud, or on mobile devices. ReCon is currently
deployed using VPN tunnels to software middleboxes
running on popular cloud platforms, because this allows
us to immediately deploy to arbitrary mobile device
OSes and ISPs.
Our key contributions are as follows:
• A study using controlled experiments to demonstrate
how PII leaks from iOS, Android, and Windows
Phone devices, motivating the need for (and potential
effectiveness of) systems that identify PII leaks
from network flows. We find extensive leaks of
device identifiers (> 50% of the top 100 apps from
all 3 OSes), user identifiers (> 14% of top 100
Android/iOS apps), locations (14-26% of top 100
Android/iOS apps) and even passwords (3 apps) in
plaintext traffic.
• An approach for the detection and extraction of PII
leaks from arbitrary network flows, using machine
learning informed by extensive ground truth for more
than 72,000 flows generated by mobile apps.
• A system that enables users to view PII leaks
from network flows, provide feedback about relevant
leaks, and optionally modify leaks.
• An evaluation of our system, showing it is efficient
(classification can be done in less than one ms),
and that it accurately identifies leaks (with 98.1%
accuracy for the vast majority of flows in our
dataset). We show that a simple C4.5 Decision
Tree (DT) classifier is able to identify PII leaks with
accuracy comparable to several ensemble methods
atop DTs (AdaBoost, Bagging, and Blending) that
take significantly more processing time (by a factor
of 7.24).
• A comparison with three alternative techniques for
detecting PII leaks using information flow analysis.
We show that overall ReCon finds more PII leaks
than all three approaches. Further, ReCon can
leverage information flow analysis techniques to
improve its coverage, as we demonstrate in §5.3.
• A characterization of our approach on traffic
generated by user devices as part of an IRB-approved
1We support SSL decryption for controlled experiments and private
ReCon instances, but disable them in user studies for privacy reasons.
user study. We demonstrate that our approach
successfully identifies PII leaks (with users providing
5,351 labels for PII leaks) and characterize how these
users’ PII is leaked “in the wild.” For example, we
find previously unreported sensitive information such
as usernames and passwords (21 apps) being leaked
in plaintext flows.
In the next section, we motivate our work using the
results of controlled experiments identifying extensive
information leakage in popular apps. We then describe
the design (§3) and implementation (§4) of ReCon. We
validate our design choices using controlled experiments
in §5 and in §6 we show their relevance “in the wild” with
a deployment of ReCon using an IRB-approved study
with 92 participants. We discuss related work in §7 and
conclude in §8. The code and data from our controlled
experiments are open-source and publicly available at:
http://recon.meddle.mobi/codeanddata.html
2 Motivation and Challenges
In this section, we use controlled experiments to measure
PII leakage with ground-truth information. We find
a surprisingly large volume of PII leaks from popular
apps from four app stores, particularly in plaintext
(unencrypted) flows. Based on these results, we identify
several core challenges for detecting PII leaks when we
do not have ground-truth information, i.e., for network
traffic generated by arbitrary users’ devices. In the next
section, we describe how to automatically infer PII leaks
in network flows when the contents of PII is not known
in advance.
2.1 Definition of PII
Personally identifiable information (PII) is a generic
term referring to “information which can be used to
distinguish or trace an individual’s identity” [37]. These
can include geographic locations, unique identifiers,
phone numbers and other similar data.
Central to this work is identifying PII leaked by
apps over the network. In this paper, we define
PII to be either (1) Device Identifiers specific to a
device or OS installation (ICCID, IMEI, IMSI, MAC
address, Android ID, Android Advertiser ID, iOS IFA
ID, Windows Phone Device ID), (2) User Identifiers,
which identify the user (name, gender, date of birth, e-
mail address, mailing address, relationship status), (3)
Contact Information (phone numbers, address book
information), (4) Location (GPS latitude and longitude,
zip code), or (5) Credentials (username, password).
This list of PII is informed by information leaks observed
in this study. While this list is not exhaustive, we believe
2
it covers most of the PII that concerns users. We will
update the list of tracked PII as we learn of additional
types of PII leaks.
2.2 Threat Model
To improve user privacy, we should inform users of
any PII that is exposed to eavesdroppers over insecure
connections, and any unnecessary PII exposed to
other parties over secure (i.e., encrypted) connections.
Determining what information is necessary to share
remains an open problem that we do not solve in
this work, so we consider the upper bound of all PII
transmitted to other parties.
Specifically, we define a “leak” as any PII, as
described in Section §2.1, that is sent over the network
from a device to a first or third party over both secure
(i.e., HTTPS) and insecure (i.e., HTTP) channels. We
further define the following two threat scenarios:
Data-exfiltrating apps. In this scenario, the app
developers either directly, or indirectly via advertising
and analytics libraries, collect PII from the users’
mobile devices, beyond what would be required for the
main functionality of the apps. In this work, we do
not establish whether a PII leak is required for app
functionality; rather, we make all leaks transparent to
users so they can decide whether any individual leak is
acceptable.
Eavesdropping on network traffic. Here, the adversary
learns PII about a user by listening to network traffic
that is exposed in plaintext (e.g., at an unencrypted
wireless access point, or by tapping on wired network
traffic). Sensitive information, such as passwords, are
sent over insecure channels, leaving the users vulnerable
to eavesdropping by this adversary.
ReCon addresses both scenarios by automatically
detecting PII leaks in network flows, presenting the
detected leaks to users and allowing them to modify or
block leaks. Clearly, some information should never
be sent over insecure channels. Thus, whenever ReCon
detects a security critical leak, such as a password being
sent over HTTP, we follow a responsible disclosure
procedure and notify the developer.
2.3 Controlled Experiments for Ground
Truth
Our goal with controlled experiments is to obtain
ground-truth information about network flows generated
by apps and devices. We use this data to identify PII in
network flows and to evaluate ReCon (§5).
Experiment setup. We conduct controlled experiments
using Android devices (running Android 5.1.1), an
iPhone (running iOS 8.4.1) and a Windows Phone
(running Windows 8.10.14226.359). We start each
set of experiments with a factory reset of the device
followed by connecting the device to Meddle [48].
Meddle provides visibility into network traffic through
redirection, i.e., sending all device traffic to a proxy
server using native support for virtual private network
(VPN) tunnels. Once traffic arrives at the proxy
server, we use software middleboxes to intercept and
modify the traffic. We additionally use SSLsplit [9]
to decrypt and inspect SSL flows only during our
controlled experiments where no human subject traffic
is intercepted. Our dataset and the full details of our
experiments are available on our project page at http:
//recon.meddle.mobi/codeanddata.html.
Manual tests. We manually test the 100 most popular
free apps for Android, iOS, and Windows Phone from the
Google Play store, the iOS App Store, and the Windows
Phone Store on August 9, 2015 as reported by App
Annie [2]. For each app, we install it, interact with
it for up to 5 minutes, and uninstall it. We give apps
permission to access to all requested resources (e.g.,
contacts or location). This allows us to characterize
real user interactions with popular apps in a controlled
environment. We enter unique and distinguishable user
credentials when interacting with apps to easily extract
the corresponding PII from network flows (if they are
not obfuscated). Specific inputs, such as valid login
credentials, e-mail addresses and names, are hard to
generate with automated tools [20]. Consequently, our
manual tests allow us to study app behavior and leaks of
PII not covered by our automated tests.
Automated tests. We include fully-automated tests on
the 100 Android apps used in the manual tests and
also 850 of the top 1,000 Android apps from the free,
third-party Android market AppsApk.com [3] that were
successfully downloaded and installed on an Android
device.2 We perform this test to understand how third-
party apps differ from those in the standard Google
Play store, as they are not subject to Google Play’s
restrictions and vetting process (but can still be installed
by users without rooting their phones). We automate
experiments using adb to install each app, connect the
device to the Meddle platform, start the app, perform
approximately 10,000 actions using Monkey [11], and
finally uninstall the app and reboot the device to end
any lingering connections. We limit the automated tests
to Android devices because iOS and Windows do not
provide equivalent scripting functionality.
Analysis. We use tcpdump [10] to dump raw IP traffic
and bro [5] to extract the HTTP flows that we consider
in this study, then we search for the conspicuous PII
that we loaded onto devices and used as input to text
214 apps appear both in the AppsApk and Google Play stores, but
AppsApk hosts significantly older versions.
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fields. We classify some of the destinations of PII
leaks as trackers using a publicly available database
of tracker domains [1], and recent research on mobile
ads [22, 33, 42].
2.4 PII Leaked from Popular Apps
We use the traffic traces from our controlled experiments
to identify how apps leak PII over HTTP and HTTPS.
For our analysis we focus on the PII listed in §2.1.
Some of this information may be required for normal
app operation; however, sensitive information such as
credentials should never travel across the network in
plaintext.
Table 1 presents PII leaked by iOS, Android and
Windows apps in plaintext. Device identifiers, which
can be used to track user’s behavior, are the PII leaked
most frequently by popular apps. Table 1 shows
that other PII—user identifiers, contacts, location, and
credentials such as username and password—are also
leaked in plaintext. Importantly, our manual tests
identify important PII not found by automated tests (e.g.,,
Monkey) such as user identifiers and credentials. Thus,
previous studies based on automation underestimate
leakage and are insufficient for good coverage of PII
leaks.
Cross-platform app behavior. We observed that the
information leaked by an app varied across OSes. Of
the top 100 apps for Android, 16 apps are available on
all the three OSes. Of these 16 apps, 11 apps leaked PII
in plaintext on at least one OS: 2 apps leaked PII on all
the three OSes, 5 apps leaked PII in exactly one OS, and
the remaining 4 apps leaked PII in 2 of the OSes. A key
take-away is that PII analysis based only on one OS does
not generalize to all OSes.
Leaks over SSL. During our experiments, we observed
that PII is also sent over encrypted channels. In
many cases, this is normal app behavior (e.g., sending
credentials when logging in to a site, or sending GPS data
to a navigation app). However, when such information
leaks to third parties, there is a potential PII leak. We
focus on the PII leaked to tracker domains [1], and
find that 6 iOS apps, 2 Android apps and 1 Windows
app send PII to trackers over SSL. The vast majority of
this information is device identifiers, with three cases of
username leaks. While SSL traffic contains a minority
of PII leaks, there is clearly still a need to address leaks
from encrypted flows.
Our observations are a conservative estimate of PII
leakage because we did not attempt to detect obfuscated
PII leaks (e.g., via salted hashing), and several apps used
certificate pinning (10 iOS, 15 Android, and 7 Windows
apps) or did not work with VPNs enabled (4 iOS apps
and 1 Android app).3 Our results in §5.3 indicate that
obfuscation is rare today, and our results above show that
significant PII leaks are indeed visible in plaintext.
2.5 Summary and Challenges
While the study above trivially revealed significant PII
leaks from popular mobile apps, several key challenges
remain for detecting PII leaks more broadly.
Detection without knowing PII. A key challenge is how
to detect PII when we do not know the contents of PII in
advance. One strawman solution is to simply block all
advertising and tracking sites. However, this is a blunt
and indiscriminate approach that can disrupt business
models supporting free apps. In fact, the developers
of the top paid iOS app Peace (which blocks all ads)
recently withdrew their app from the App Store for this
reason [39].
Another strawman solution is to automatically (and/or
symbolically) run every app in every app store to
determine when PII is leaked. This allows us to
formulate a regular expression to identify PII leaks from
every app regardless of the user: we simply replace the
PII with a wildcard.
There are several reasons why this is insufficient to
identify PII leaks for arbitrary user flows. First, it
is impractically expensive to run this automation for
all apps in every app store, and there are no publicly
available tools for doing this outside of Android. Second,
it is difficult (if not impossible) to use automation to
explore every possible code path that would result in PII
leaks, meaning this approach would miss significant PII.
Third, this approach is incredibly brittle – if a tracker
changes the contents of flows leaking PII at all, the
regular expression would fail.
These issues suggest an alternative approach to
identifying PII in network flows: use machine learning
to build a model of PII leaks that accurately identifies
them for arbitrary users. This would allow us to use a
small set of training flows, combined with user feedback
about suspected PII leaks, to inform the identification of
a PII leaks for a large number of apps.
Encoding and formatting. PII leaked over the network
can be encoded using Unicode and other techniques like
gzip, JSON, and XML, so a technique to identify PII
in network flows must support a variety of formats. In
our experience, it is relatively straightforward to extract
the encoding for a flow and search for PII using this
encoding. We support the encodings mentioned above,
and will add support for others as we encounter them.
Encryption. Flows in the mobile environment
increasingly use encryption (often via SSL). Sandvine
3Details and the complete dataset can be found on our website.
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# Apps leaking a given PII
Testing # of Device User Contact
OS Store Technique Apps Identifier Identifier Information Location Credentials
iOS App Store Manual 100 47 (47.0%) 14 (14.0%) 2 (2.0%) 26 (26.0%) 8 (8.0%)
Android Google Play Manual 100 52 (52.0%) 15 (15.0%) 1 (1.0%) 14 (14.0%) 7 (7.0%)
Windows WP Store Manual 100 55 (55.0%) 3 (3.0%) 0 (0.0%) 8 (8.0%) 1 (1.0%)
Android AppsApk Automated 850 155 (18.2%) 6 (0.7%) 8 (0.9%) 40 (4.7%) 0 (0.0%)
Android Google Play Automated 100 52 (52.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 6 (6.0%) 0 (0.0%)
Table 1: Summary of PII leaked in plaintext (HTTP) by iOS, Android and Windows Phone apps. User identifiers
and credentials are leaked across all platforms. Popular iOS apps leak location information more often than the popular
Android and Windows apps.
reports that in 2014 in North American mobile traffic,
approximately 12.5% of upstream bytes use SSL, up
from 9.78% the previous year [53]. By comparison,
11.8% of bytes came from HTTP in 2014, down from
14.66% the previous year. A key challenge is how
to detect PII leaks in such encrypted flows. ReCon
identifies PII leaks in plaintext network traffic, so it
would require access to the original plaintext content
to work. While getting such access is a challenge
orthogonal to this work, we argue that this is feasible
for a wide range of traffic if users run an SSL proxy on
a trusted computer (e.g., the user’s home appliance, such
as a computer or home gateway) or use recent techniques
for mediated access to encrypted traffic [47, 54].
Obfuscation of PII. The parties leaking PII may use
obfuscation to hide their information leaks. In our
experiments, we found little evidence of this (§ 5.3).
In the future, we anticipate combining our approach
with static and dynamic analysis techniques to identify
how information is being obfuscated, and adjust our
system to identify the obfuscated PII. For example, using
information flow analysis, we can reverse-engineer how
obfuscation is done (e.g., for salted hashing, learn the
salt and hash function), then use this information when
analyzing network traces to identify leaked PII. In the
ensuing cat-and-mouse game, we envision automating
this process of reverse engineering obfuscation.
3 ReCon Goals and Design
The previous section shows that current OSes do not
provide sufficient visibility into PII leaks, provide few
options to control it, and thus significant amounts of
potentially sensitive information is exfiltrated from user
devices. To address this, we built ReCon, a tool that
detects PII leaks, visualizes how users’ information is
shared with various sites, and allows users to change
the shared information (including modifying PII or even
blocking connections entirely).
The high-level goal of our work is to explore the extent
to which we can address privacy issues in mobile systems
at the network level. The sub-goals of ReCon are as
follows:
• Accurately identify PII in network flows, without
requiring knowledge of users’ PII a priori.
• Improve awareness of PII leaks by presenting this
information to users.
• Automatically improve the classification of sensitive
PII based on user feedback.
• Enable users to change these flows by modifying or
removing PII.
To achieve the first three goals, we determine what
PII is leaked in network flows using network trace
analysis, machine learning, and user feedback. We
achieve the last goal by providing users with an interface
to block or modify the PII shared over the network.
This paper focuses on how to address the research
challenges in detecting and revealing PII leaks; as part
of ongoing work outside the scope of this paper, we are
investigating other UIs for modifying PII leaks, how to
use crowdsourcing to help design PII-modifying rules,
and how we can use ReCon to provide other types of
privacy (e.g., k-anonymity).
Figure 1 presents the architecture of the ReCon
system. In the “offline” phase, we use labeled network
traces to determine which features of network flows to
use for learning when PII is being leaked, then train a
classifier using this data, finally producing a model for
predicting whether PII is leaked. When new network
flows enter ReCon (the “online” phase), we use the
model to determine whether a flow is leaking PII and
present the suspected PII leak to the user via the ReCon
Web UI (Fig. 2). We currently detect PII as described
in the previous section, and will add other PII types as
we discover them. Note that our approach can detect any
PII that appears in network traffic as long as we obtain
labeled examples.
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Features
Initial Training
Continuous training with user feedback
Training
Model Prediction User Interface
Rewriter
Model
User Feedback
Flows
Flows
Figure 1: ReCon architecture. We initially select
features and train a model using labeled network flows
(top), then use this model to predict whether new
network flows are leaking PII. Based on user feedback,
we retrain our classifier (bottom). Periodically, we
update our classifier with results from new controlled
experiments.
We collect labels from users (i.e., whether our
suspected PII is correct) via the UI and integrate the
results into our classifier to improve future predictions
(left). In addition, ReCon supports a map view, where
we display the location information that each domain
is learning about the user (right). By using a Web
interface, ReCon users can gain visibility and control
into their PII leaks without installing an app. A demo of
ReCon is available at http://recon.meddle.mobi/
DTL-ReconDemo.mp4.
To support control of PII, ReCon allows users to tell
the system to replace PII with other text (or nothing)
for future flows (see the drop-down boxes in Fig. 2(a)).
Users can specify blocking or replacement of PII based
on category, domain, or app. This protects users’ PII
for future network activity, but does not entirely prevent
PII from leaking in the first place. To address this, we
support interactive PII labeling and filtering, using push
notifications4 or other channels to notify the user of leaks
immediately when they are detected (as done in a related
study [15]).
3.1 Non-Goals
ReCon is not intended as a blanket replacement
for existing approaches to improve privacy in the
mobile environment. For example, information flow
analysis [24] may identify PII leaks not revealed by
ReCon. In fact, ReCon can leverage information
flow analysis techniques to improve its coverage, as
4Push notifications require a companion app, and we currently
support Android (we plan to release iOS and Windows versions soon).
(a) PII leaks and actions (b) Map view of location leaks
Figure 2: Screen capture of the ReCon user interface.
Users can view how their PII is leaked, validate the
suspected PII leaks, and create custom filters to block
or modify leaks.
we demonstrate in §5.3. Importantly, ReCon allows
us to identify and block unobfuscated PII in network
flows from arbitrary devices without requiring OS
modifications or taint tracking.
The need for access to plaintext traffic is an inherent
limitation of our approach. We discussed several ways to
address encryption and obfuscation of PII in the previous
section. If these should fail, we can recover plaintext
traffic with OS support for access to network traffic
content as it appears before encryption or obfuscation.
Of course, getting such support from an OS could be
challenging. Alternatively, policymakers such as the
FTC could intervene by barring developers from using
techniques that explicitly eschew auditing tools such as
ReCon, by citing it as a type of “deceptive business
practice” currently disallowed in the US.
3.2 Deployment Model and User Adoption
Because ReCon needs access only to network traffic
to identify and modify PII leaks, it admits a variety
of deployment models, e.g.,, in the cloud, in home
devices, inside an ISP, or on mobile devices. We are
currently hosting this service on Meddle in a cloud-
based deployment because it provides immediate cross-
platform support with low overheads [48]. We are also
in discussions with Telefonica to deploy ReCon on their
Awazza [4] APN proxy, which has attracted thousands of
users.
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Section Topic Dataset Key results
4.1 Implementation Controlled exp. Feature extraction and selection, per-domain per-OS classifiers
4.2 ” Controlled exp. Automatically identifying PII in flows
5.2 Evaluation: ML techniques Controlled exp. Decision trees provide best trade-off for accuracy/speed, per-domain
per-OS classifiers outperform general ones, feature selection balances
accuracy and training time, heuristics for PII extraction are accurate
5.3 Evaluation: IFA comparison Automated exp. ReCon generally outperforms information flow analysis techniques, and
can learn new association rules from them to further improve accuracy
6 Evaluation: “in the wild” User study ReCon is efficient, users labels confirm accuracy of ReCon even for
apps not previously seen, retraining based on user labels substantially
improves accuracy, significant amounts of sensitive information is
leaked in plaintext from popular apps.
Table 2: Roadmap for key topics covered in §4, §5 and §6. We train and test our classifier using 10-fold cross-
validation, i.e.,, a random 9/10 samples for training and the remaining 1/10 for testing; we repeat this process 10 times
to tune our parameters.
3.3 Protecting User Privacy
An important concern with a ReCon user study is
privacy. Using an IRB-approved protocol [8], we
encrypt and anonymize all captured flows before storing
them. We have two deployment models: the first study
(approval #13-08-04) captures all of a subject’s Internet
traffic and entails in-person, signed informed consent;
the second study (approval #13-11-17) captures only
HTTP GET/POST parameters (where most leaks occur)
and users consent via an online form. The secret key is
stored on a separate secure server and users can delete
their data at any time. We will make the ReCon source
code publicly available. For those who want to run
their own ReCon instance (e.g., if they do not want to
participate in our study), our system requires only that
a user has root on a Linux OS. ReCon can be deployed
ReCon can be deployed in a single-machine instance on
a home computer, as Raspberry Pi plugged into a home
router, a dedicated server in an enterprise, a VM in the
cloud, or on the device itself. One can also selectively
route traffic to different ReCon instances, e.g.,, to a cloud
instance for HTTP traffic and a trusted home instance
or on-device software such as HayStack [50] to decrypt
HTTPS connections to identify PII leaked over SSL.
4 Recon Implementation
We now discuss key aspects of our implementation.
We then evaluate our design decisions in the following
section, and finally demonstrate how they hold up “in
the wild” via a user study with 92 participants. Table 2
presents a roadmap for the remainder of the paper,
highlighting key design decisions, evaluation criteria,
and results. The ReCon pipeline begins with parsing
network flows, then passing each flow to a machine
learning classifier for labeling it as containing a PII leak
or not.
4.1 Machine Learning Techniques
We use the weka data mining tool [28] to train classifiers
that predict PII leaks. We train our classifier by
extracting relevant features and providing labels for
flows that leak PII as described below. Our input
dataset is the set of labeled flows from our controlled
experiments in §2.3. To evaluate our classifiers, we use
k-fold cross validation, where a random (k−1)/k of the
flows in our dataset are used to train the classifier, and the
remaining 1/k of the flows are tested for accuracy. This
process is repeated n times to understand the stability of
our results (see §5).
Feature extraction. The problem of identifying
whether a flow contains PII is similar to the document
classification problem,5 so we use the “bag-of-words”
model [31]. We choose certain characters as separators
and consider anything between those separators to be
words. Then for each flow, we produce a vector of binary
values where each word that appears in a flow is set to 1,
and each word that does not is set to 0.
A key challenge for feature extraction in network
flows is that there is no standard token (e.g., whitespace
or punctuation) to use for splitting flows into words.
For example, a colon (:) could be part of a MAC
address (e.g., 02:00:00:00:00), a time-of-day (e.g.,
11:59), or JSON data (e.g., username:user007).
Further frustrating attempts to select features, one
domain uses “=>” as a delimiter (in username
=>user007). In these cases, there is no single
technique that covers all flows. Instead, we use a
number of different delimiters “,;/(){}[]” to handle
the common case, and treat ambiguous delimiters by
inspecting the surrounding content to determine the
encoding type based on context (e.g., looking at content-
5Here, network flows are documents and structured data are words.
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encoding hints in the HTTP header or whether the
content appears in a GET parameter).
Feature selection. A simple bag-of-words model
produces too many features to be useful for training
accurate classifiers that make predictions within
milliseconds (to intercept PII leaks in real time). To
reduce the feature set, we assume that low-frequency
words are unlikely to be associated with PII leaks,
because when PII does leak, it rarely leaks just once.
On the other hand, session keys and other ephemeral
identifiers tend to appear in exactly one flow. Based
on this intuition, we apply a simple threshold-based
filter that removes a feature if its word frequency is
too small. We select a reasonable threshold value
empirically, by balancing accuracy and classification
time for labeled data (discussed in §5.2.3). To avoid
filtering PII leaks that occur rarely in our labeled data,
we oversample rarely occurring PII leaks(so that their
number occurrences is greater than the filter threshold).
In addition, we randomize PII values (e.g.,, locations,
device IDs) in each flow when training to prevent the
classifier from using a PII value as a feature.
While the above filter removes ephemeral identifiers
from our feature set, we must also address the
problem of words that commonly appear. Several
important examples include information typically found
in HTTP flows, such as “content-length:”, “en-us”, and
“expires”. We thus add stop-word-based filtering on
HTTP flows, where the stop words are determined by
term frequency—inverse document frequency (tf-idf).
We include only features that have fairly low tf-idf values
and that did not appear adjacent to a PII leak in a flow
from our controlled experiments.
Per-domain-and-OS and general classifiers. We find
that PII leaks to the same destination domain use
the same (or similar) data encodings to transfer data
over the network, but that this encoding may differ
across different OSes. Based on this observation, we
build per-domain-and-OS models (one classifier for each
[destination domain, OS] pair) instead of one single
general classifier. We identify the domain associated
with each flow based on the Host: parameter in the
HTTP header. If this header is not available, we can
also identify the domain associated with each IP address
by finding the corresponding DNS lookup in packet
traces. We identify the OS based on the fact that
different OSes use different authentication mechanisms
in our VPN, and users tell us in advance which OS
they are using. This improves prediction accuracy
because the classifier typically needs to learn a small
set of association rules. Further, per-domain-and-
OS classifiers improve performance in terms of lower-
latency predictions (§5.2.3), important for detecting and
intercepting PII leaks in-band.
The above approach works well if there is a
sufficiently large sample of labeled data to train to the
per-domain per-OS classifier. For domains that do not
see sufficient traffic, we build a (cross-domain) general
classifier. The general classifier tends to have few labeled
PII leaks, making it susceptible to bias (e.g., 5% of
flows in our general classifier are PII leaks). To address
this, we use undersampling on negative samples, using
1/10 sampling to randomly choose a subset of available
samples.
Note that we do not need to train classifiers on every
domain in the Internet; rather, we train only on domains
contacted by users’ traffic. Further, we do not need every
user to label every PII leak; rather, we need only a small
number of labeled instances from a small number of
users to identify PII leaks for all users whose traffic visits
those domains.
Adapting to PII leaks “in the wild.” A key challenge
for any ML technique is identifying flows leaking PII that
were never seen in controlled experiments. To mitigate
this problem, we integrate user feedback from flows that
we did identify using one of our classifiers. Specifically,
when a user provides feedback that we have correctly
identified PII, we can search for that PII in historical
flows to identify cases ReCon missed due to lack of
sufficient training data. Further, we can use these flows to
retrain our classifier to successfully catch these instances
in future network flows. We discuss the effectiveness of
this approach in §6.
Any system that allows user feedback is susceptible
to incorrect labels, e.g., via user error or Sybil attacks.
There are two ways to address this. First, we can
simply train per-user classifiers, so any erroneous labels
only affect the user(s) who provide them. Second,
we can train system-wide classifiers if we can reliably
distinguish good labels from bad ones. To this end,
we envision using existing majority-voting algorithms
and/or reputation systems [35].
4.2 Automatically Extracting PII
A machine learning classifier indicates whether a flow
contains PII, but does not indicate which content in the
flow is a PII leak. The latter information is critical if we
want to present users with information about their leaks
and allow them to validate the predictions.
A key challenge for extracting PII is that the
key/value pairs used for leaking PII vary across domains
and devices; e.g., the key “device id” or “q” might
each indicate an IMEI value for different domains,
but “q” is not always associated with a PII leak.
While we found no solution that perfectly addresses
this ambiguity, we developed effective heuristics for
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identifying “suspicious” keys that are likely associated
with PII values.
We use two steps to automatically extract PII leaks
from a network flows classified as a leak. The first step
is based on the relative probability that a suspicious key
is associated with a PII leak, calculated as follows:
Ptype,key =
KPII
Kall
where type is the PII type (e.g., IMEI, e-mail address),
key is the suspicious key for that type of PII, KPII is the
number of times the key appeared in flows identified with
PII leaks, and Kall is the number times the key appeared
in all flows. The system looks for suspicious keys that
have Ptype,key greater than a threshold. We set this value
to an empirically determined value, 0.2, based on finding
the best trade-off between false positives (FPs) and true
positives (TPs) for our dataset. For users wanting more
or less sensitivity, we will make this a configurable
threshold in ReCon (e.g., if a user wants to increase
the likelihood of increasing TPs at the potential cost of
increased FPs).
In the second step, we use a decision tree classifier,
and observe that the root of each tree is likely a key
corresponding to a PII value. We thus add these roots
to the suspicious key set and assign them a large P value.
In the next section, we evaluate ReCon using
controlled experiments on a pre-labeled dataset. This
evaluation will only use the initial training phase. Next,
we evaluate ReCon in the wild with a user study on our
public deployment (§6). This evaluation will use both the
initial training phase and the continuous training phase
obtained from real users.
5 Evaluation
This section evaluates the effectiveness of ReCon in
terms of accuracy and performance. First, we describe
our methodology, then we describe the results from
controlled experiments in terms of classifier accuracy
compared to ground truth and to information flow
analysis. In the next section, we evaluate our system
based on results from a user study.
Our key finding are: 1) we demonstrate that a
decision-tree classifier is both accurate (99% overall) and
efficient (trains in seconds, predicts in sub-milliseconds);
2) ReCon identifies more PII than static and dynamic
information-flow analysis techniques, and can learn from
the results of these approaches to improve its coverage
of PII leaks. Note that this paper focuses on reliably
identifying leaks and enabling control, but does not
evaluate the control functionality.
5.1 Dataset and Methodology
To evaluate ReCon accuracy, we need app-generated
traffic and a set of labels indicating which of the
corresponding flows leak PII. For this analysis, we reuse
the data from controlled experiments presented in §2.3;
Table 3 summarizes this dataset using the number of
flows generated by the apps, and fraction that leak
PII. We identify that more than 6,500 flows leak PII,
and a significant fraction of those flows leak PII to
known trackers. The code and data from our controlled
experiments are open-source and publicly available at
http://recon.meddle.mobi/codeanddata.html.
Recall from §4.1 that we use k-fold cross-validation to
evaluate our accuracy by training and testing on different
random subsets of our labeled dataset. We tried both k =
10 and k = 5, and found these values caused only a small
difference (less than 1%) in the resulting accuracy.
We use this labeled dataset to train classifiers and
evaluate their effectiveness using the following metrics.
We define a positive flow to be one that leaks PII;
likewise a negative flow is one that does not leak PII.
A false positive occurs when a flow does not leak PII but
the classifier predicts a PII leak; a false negative occurs
when a flow leaks PII but the classifier predicts that it
does not. We measure the false positive rate (FPR) and
false negative rate (FNR); we also include the following
metrics:
• Correctly classified rate (CCR): the sum of true
positive (TP) and true negative (TN) samples divided
by the total number of samples. CCR = (T N +
T P)/(T N +T P+FN +FP).
A good classifier has a CCR value close to 1.
• Area under the curve (AUC): where the curve refers
to receiver operating characteristic (ROC). In this
approach, the x-axis is the false positive rate and y-
axis is the true positive rate (ranging in value from 0
to 1). If the ROC curve is x = y (AUC = 0.5), then the
classification is no better than randomly guessing. A
good classifier has a AUC value near 1.
To evaluate the efficiency of the classifier, we
investigate the runtime (in milliseconds) for predicting
a PII leak and extracting the suspected PII. We want
this value to be significantly lower than typical Internet
latencies.
We use the weka data mining tool to investigate the
above metrics for several candidate machine learning
approaches to identify a technique that is both efficient
and accurate. Specifically, we test Naive Bayes, C4.5
Decision Tree (DT) and several ensemble methods atop
DTs (AdaBoost, Bagging, and Blending).
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Manual tests Automated tests (Monkey)
OS (Store) iOS (App) Android (Play) Windows (WP) Android (Play) Android (AppsApk)
Apps tested 100 100 100 100 850
Apps leaking PII 63 56 61 52 164
HTTP flows 14683 14355 12487 7186 17499
Leaking PII 845 1800 969 1174 1776
Flows to trackers 1254 1854 1253 1377 5893
Leaking PII to trackers 508 567 4 414 649
Table 3: Summary of HTTP flows from controlled experiments. Manual tests generated similar numbers of flows
across platforms, but Android leaked proportionately more PII. Collectively, our dataset contains more than 6,500
flows with PII leaks.
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Figure 3: CDF of per-domain-and-OS (PDAO) classifier accuracy, for alternative classification approaches. For
the 42 PDAO classifiers, DT-based classifiers outperform Naive Bayes, and they exhibit good accuracy (high CCR and
AUC, low FPR and FNR). The vertical line depicts accuracy when using one classifier across all domains, which
leads to significantly worse performance.
5.2 Lab Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the impact of different
implementation decisions and demonstrate the overall
effectiveness of our adopted approach.
5.2.1 Machine Learning Approaches
A key question we must address is which classifier to
use. We believe that a DT-based classifier is a reasonable
choice, because most PII leaks occur in structured data
(i.e., key/value pairs), and a decision tree can naturally
represent chained dependencies between these keys and
the likelihood of leaking PII.
To evaluate this claim, we tested a variety of classifiers
according to the accuracy metrics from the previous
section, and present the results in Fig. 3. We plot
the accuracy using a CDF over the domains that we
use to build per-domain per-OS classifiers as described
in §4.1. The top two graphs (overall accuracy via
CCR and AUC), show that Naive Bayes has the worst
performance, and nearly all the DT-based ensemble
methods have high CCR and AUC values. (Note that
the x-axis does not start at 0.)
Among the ensemble methods, Blending with
DTs and k-nearest-neighbor (kNN) yields the highest
accuracy; however, the resulting accuracy is not
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significantly better than a simple DT. Importantly, a
simple DT takes significantly less time to train than
ensemble methods. For ensemble methods, the training
time largely depends on the number of iterations for
training. When we set this value to 10, we find that
ensemble methods take 7.24 times longer to train than
a simple DT on the same dataset. Given the significant
extra cost with minimal gain in accuracy, we currently
use simple DTs.
The bottom figures show that most DT-based
classifiers have zero FPs (71.4%) and FNs (76.2%)
for the majority of domains. Further, the overall
accuracy across all per-domain per-OS classifiers is
>99%. The domains with poor accuracy are the
trackers rlcdn.com and turn.com, due to the fact
their positive and negative flows are very similar. For
example, the key partner uid is associated both with
an Android ID value and another unknown identifier.
To provide intuition as to why DTs work well, and
why PII leak detection presents a nontrivial machine-
learning problem, we include several examples of DTs
trained using our data. Some cases of PII leaks are
simple: Fig. 4(a) shows that Android Advertiser ID is
always leaked to the tracker applovin.com when the
text idfa is present in network traffic. Other cases are
not trivial, as seen in Fig. 4(b). Here, we find that auid
is not always associated with an IMEI value, and the
DT captures the fact that the IMEI will not be present
for a getImage.php5 request if the urid is present.
Finally, Fig. 4(c) gives an example of a non-trivial DT
for a different type of PII—e-mail address. Here, the
term email appears in both positive and negative flows,
so this feature cannot be used alone. However, our
classifier learns that the leak happens in a /user/
request when the terms session and deviceId are
not present.6 Overall, 62% of DTs are the simple case
(Fig. 4(a)), but more than a third have a depth greater
than two, indicating a significant fraction of cases where
association rules are nontrivial.
5.2.2 Per-Domain-and-OS Classifiers
We now evaluate the impact of using individual per-
domain-and-OS (PDAO) classifiers, instead of one
general classifier for all flows. We build PDAO
classifiers for all domains with greater than 100 samples
(i.e., labeled flows), at least one of which leaks PII. For
the remaining flows, there is insufficient training data to
inform a classifier, so we create a general classifier based
6Note that in this domain deviceId is actually used for an app-
specific identifier, not a device identifier.
on the assumption that a significant fraction of the flows
use a common structure for leaking PII.7
We evaluate the impact of PDAO classifiers on overall
accuracy in Figure 3. The vertical lines in the subgraphs
represent values for the general classifier, which is
trained using all flows from all domains. The figure
shows that >95% of the PDAO classifiers have higher
accuracy than the general classifier. Further, the high-
accuracy PDAO classifiers cover the vast majority of
flows in our dataset (91%). Last, training PDAO
classifiers is substantially less expensive in terms of
runtime: it takes minutes to train PDAO classifiers for
thousands of flows, but it takes hours to train general
classifiers for the same flows.
5.2.3 Feature Selection
The accuracy of the classifiers described above largely
depends on correctly identifying the subset of features
for training. Further, the training time for classifiers
increases significantly as the number of features
increases, meaning that an efficient classifier requires
culling of unimportant features. A key challenge in
ReCon is determining how to select such features given
the large potential set derived from the bag-of-words
approach.
We use Figure 5 to illustrate this problem and how we
address it. Here, we focus on statistics for the tracker
domain mopub.com (266 flows out of 1,276 leak PII);
other domains exhibited similar properties.
First, we focus on the threshold for including features
in our training set. As described in § 4.1, we filter out
features from words that appear infrequently. Fig. 5(a)
shows the impact of this decision on training time, where
the x-axis is the minimum number of appearances for a
word to be included as a feature, and the y-axis is the
time required to train a classifier on the resulting features.
The figure shows that including all words (threshold
= 1) significantly increases training time, but there is
a minimal impact on training time if the threshold is
greater than or equal to 20. The corresponding number
of features decreases from 450 to 29 as the threshold for
word occurrence increases from 1 to 99.
Picking the right number of features is also important
for classifier accuracy, as too many features may lead
to overfitting and too few features may lead to an
incomplete model. We evaluate this using Fig. 5(b),
where the x-axis is the number of features, the left y-
axis is accuracy (the y-axis does not start at zero), and
the right y-axis is training time. Even small numbers
of features lead to high accuracy for this domain, but
7Note that once ReCon acquires sufficient labeled data (e.g., from
users or controlled experiments) for a destination domain, we create a
PDAO classifier.
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(b) Non-trivial DT for device identifier
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Figure 4: Example decision trees (DTs) for ReCon’s per-domain per-OS classifiers. The classifier beings at the
root (top) node, and traverses the tree based on whether the term at each node is present. The leaves (boxes) indicate
whether there is a PII leak (positive) or not (negative) for each path. The top right of each figure shows the number of
positive/negative samples used to train each DT.
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Figure 5: Feature selection for the tracker domain mopub.com. Using ≈200 features leads to high accuracy and low
training times; however, adding more features increases training time with no benefit to accuracy.
increasing the number of features beyond 250 does not
improve performance (but does increase training time).
We see a similar effect on the FP rate in Fig. 5(c).
While the training time may not seem high in this
context, we note that this cost must be incurred for each
domain and each time we want to update the classifier
with user-labeled flows. With potentially thousands
of flows and labels in a large-scale deployment, such
training times can significantly affect the scalability and
responsiveness of ReCon.
With this in mind, we propose the following strategies
for picking threshold values. First, we can use the above
analysis to find the best threshold, then periodically
update this threshold based on new labeled data. Second,
we can pick a fixed threshold based on the average
threshold across all domains (word frequency = 21).
We evaluated the impact of these two approaches, and
found they were nearly identical for our dataset. This
suggests that a fixed value is sufficient for our dataset,
but we propose periodically updating this threshold by
performing the above analysis daily or weekly as a low-
priority background process.
5.2.4 PII Extraction Strategies
As discussed in § 4.2, we use two heuristics to identify
key/value pairs that are likely to leak PII. We use our
dataset to evaluate this approach, and find that the FP
and FN rates are 2.2% and 3.5%, respectively. By
comparison, a naive approach that treats each key/value
pair equally yields FP and FN rates of 5.1% and 18.8%,
respectively. Our approach is thus significantly better,
and our FP and FN rates are low enough to correctly
extract PII the vast majority of the time.
5.3 Comparison with IFA
Our labeled dataset in the above analysis may miss PII
leaks that are obfuscated or otherwise hidden from our
analysis. We now evaluate our approach by comparing
with one that is resilient to such issues: information
flow analysis (IFA). We experiment with three IFA
techniques: (1) static IFA with FlowDroid [13], (2)
dynamic IFA with TaintDroid [24] (via Andrubis [43]),
and (3) AppAudit [58], which uses a combination of both
static and approximated dynamic analysis. Each of these
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Approach #apps leaking PII Device User Contact Location Credentials(#reports) Identifier Identifier Information
FlowDroid (Static IFA) 91 (546) 51 (21.52%) 0(-) 9 (52.94%) 52 (64.20%) ×
Andrubis (Dynamic IFA) 90 (497) 78 (35.46%) × 10 (62.50%) 3 (3.75%) ×
AppAudit (Hybrid IFA) 64 (620) 57 (24.05%) × 3 (17.65%) 4 (4.94%) ×
ReCon 155 (750) 145 (61.18%) 6 (100%) 4 (23.53%) 29 (35.80%) 0 (-)
Union of all approaches 278 (750) 237 6 17 81 0
Table 4: Comparison of ReCon with information flow analysis (IFA) tools. This comparison is based on automated
tests for 750 Android apps (apps from the Google Play and AppsApk dataset for which we observed network flows).
We present the number of Android apps detected as leaking PII (or in the case of FlowDroid, flagged as potentially
leaking PII), as well as the percentage of leaking apps detected by each tool out of all leaking apps detected by any of
the tested tools in each category (× means the tool does not track that type of information). User credentials were not
leaked because our automation tools cannot input them.
tools has limitations: some are very resource intensive
and some pose restrictions on the type of apps they can
successfully analyze.
Static IFA. FlowDroid detects PII leaks as data
flowing between sensitive sources and sinks, which are
configured via a list of Android API calls. However,
the analysis is quite resource intensive: for 4.99% of
apps, our available memory of 8GB was insufficient for
analysis; for 17.24% of apps the analysis exceeded our
analysis timeout of 30 minutes. The detected leaks are
reported as paths between the API calls. Note that this
approach can lead to false positives, since a detected leak
may never be triggered during app execution.
Dynamic IFA. Andrubis is an app analysis sandbox that
uses TaintDroid to identify PII leaks from Android apps
during dynamic analysis. Andrubis installs each app
in an emulated Android environment and monitors its
behavior for 240 seconds. Besides calling all of the app’s
registered components and simulating common events,
such as incoming SMS and location changes, it uses
Monkey [11] to generate approximately 8,000 pseudo-
random user events. In addition to detailed analysis
report including all detected data leaks, it also provides
the recorded network packet traces. However, this
analysis fails for 33.73% of apps because they exceed
the file size and/or API level limit of Andrubis.
Hybrid IFA. AppAudit flags functions that potentially
leak PII through static analysis, then performs simulated
dynamic analysis to filter out candidate functions to
confirm PII leaks. It reports leaks to the network,
file system and through SMS from sources such as the
location, contacts and device identifiers. The analysis
failed for 17.33% of apps. Note that AppAudit only
approximates the execution of suspicious functions, and
thus does not record any network packet traces.
Methodology and results. We use the 850 apps from
AppsApk.com and the top 100 apps from Google Play
from §2.3, and focus on the 750 apps that produced
network traffic in our experiments. Since static and
hybrid IFA approaches do not provide network flows,
they only indicate whether an app will potentially leak
a certain type of PII. To compare these techniques
with dynamic analysis, we base our comparison on the
number of apps that potentially leak a certain type of PII.
Specifically, we flag an app as leaking a certain type of
PII if any tool detected an actual or potential PII leak
in that category (this occurs for 278 apps). We further
filtered out cases where dynamic analysis incorrectly
flagged a PII leak.
Table 4 shows the number and percentage of apps
that were flagged by FlowDroid, Andrubis, AppAudit
and ReCon. FlowDroid mainly identified potential
location and phone number leaks, while AppAudit
mainly identified IMEI leaks. Andrubis performed well
in detecting device identifiers (ICCID, IMEI, IMSI) and
the phone number. Importantly, ReCon identifies more
PII leaks overall, and in more categories than IFA.
The above results are encouraging for ReCon, and
we further investigated mismatches between ReCon and
TaintDroid results, since the latter provides network
traces that we can process via ReCon. Note, as the
authors of TaintDroid themselves acknowledge [24], it
may generate false positives (particularly for arrays and
IMSI values), due to propagating taint labels per variable
and IPC message. We thus manually inspected flows
flagged as leaking PII, and discarded cases where the
identified PII did not appear in plaintext network flows
(i.e., false positives). Table 5 shows the results of our
analysis, grouped by PII type.
We use the plaintext leaks identified by Andrubis as
ground truth, and evaluate our system by sending the
Andrubis network traffic through ReCon trained with
the pre-labeled dataset described in Section §5.1. The
ReCon false positive rate was quite low (0.11%), but the
false negative rate was relatively high (15.6%). The vast
majority of false negative flows were Device ID leaks
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Type of PII being leaked
# leaks Device User Con- Loca- Cred-
detected Id. Id. tacts tion entials
A
nd
ru
bi
s plaintext 173 N/A 10 8 N/A
obfuscated 124 N/A 16 0 N/A
incorrect 140 N/A 24 6 N/A
Total 457 N/A 50 14 N/A
R
eC
on TP 146 17 7 35 0
FN 27 0 0 0 0
Table 5: Comparison with Andrubis (which internally
uses TaintDroid), for Android apps only. Note that
this table counts the number of flows leaking PII, not
the number of apps. TaintDroid has a higher false
positive rate than ReCon, but catches more device
identifiers. After retraining ReCon with these results,
ReCon correctly identifies all PII leaks. Further, ReCon
identifies PII leaks that TaintDroid does not.
(124/457 are obfuscated and 140/457 are false positive
reports from Andrubis). Importantly, when we retrain
ReCon’s classifier with the Andrubis data, we find that
all of the false negatives disappear. Thus, ReCon is
adaptive in that its accuracy should only improve as we
provide it more and diverse sets of labeled data. In the
next section we describe results suggesting that we can
also use crowdsourcing to provide labeled data.
In addition, we can use network traces labeled by IFA
to train ReCon even in the presence of PII obfuscation.
This works because ReCon does not search for PII itself,
but rather the contextual clues in network traffic that
reliably indicate that PII is leaking.
Finally, ReCon identified several instances of PII leaks
that are not tracked by IFA. These include the Android
ID, MAC address, user credentials, gender, birthdays,
ZIP codes, and e-mail addresses.
6 ReCon in the Wild
We now describe the results of our IRB-approved user
study, where participants used ReCon for at least one
week and up to over 200 days, interacted with our system
via the UI, and completed a follow-up survey. Our
study is biased toward flows from the US due to initial
recruitment in the Boston area, but includes connections
from users in 21 countries in four continents. While
we cannot claim representativeness, we can use the
user feedback quantitatively, to understand the impact
of labeling on our classifiers. We also use the study
qualitatively, to understand what PII was leaked from
participant devices but not in our controlled experiments,
and to understand users’ opinions about privacy.
The study includes 92 users in total, with 63 iOS
devices and 33 Android devices (some users have more
than one device). In the initial training phase, we
initialized the ReCon classifiers with the pre-labeled
dataset discussed in §5. Then we use the continuous
user feedback to retrain the classifiers. The anonymized
results of PII leaks discovered from our ongoing user
study can be found at http://recon.meddle.mobi/
app-report.html.
Runtime. While the previous section focused on runtime
in terms of training time, an important goal for ReCon is
to predict and extract PII in-band with network flows so
that we can block/modify the PII as requested by users.
As a result, the network delay experienced by ReCon
traffic depends on the efficiency of the classifier.
We evaluated ReCon performance in terms of PII
prediction and extraction times. The combined cost of
these steps is less than 0.25 ms per flow on average (std.
dev. 0.88), and never exceeds 6.47 ms per flow. We
believe this is sufficiently small compared to end-to-end
delays of tens or hundreds of milliseconds in mobile
networks.
Accuracy “in the wild.” Participants were asked to
view their PII leaks via the ReCon UI, and label them as
correct or incorrect. As of Dec 8, 2015, our study covers
1,120,278 flows, 9,573 of which contained PII leaks that
ReCon identified. Of those, there are 5,351 TP leaks,
39 FP leaks and 4,183 unlabeled leaks. Table 6 shows
the results across all users. The users in the study found
few cases when ReCon incorrectly labeled PII leaks.
The vast majority (85.6%) of unlabeled data is device
identifiers, likely because it is difficult for users to find
such identifiers to compare with our results.
Impact of user feedback on accuracy. To evaluate the
impact of retraining classifiers based on user feedback,
we compare the results without user feedback (using our
initial training set only) with those that incorporate user
feedback. After retraining the classifier, the false positive
rate decreased by 92% (from 39 to 3), with a minor
impact on false negatives (0.5% increase, or 18/5,351).
Retraining classifiers. As discussed in §4.1, we
retrain ReCon classifiers periodically and after collecting
sufficient samples. We provide options to set the
frequency of retraining and the retraining process is
relatively low cost. In our experience, retraining the
general classifier once a day or once a week is sufficient
to retain high accuracy. This is a process that occurs in
the background, takes little time per domain (0.9 s per
domain on average), and is easily parallelized to reduce
retraining time.
User survey. To qualitatively answer whether ReCon
is effective, we conducted a survey where we asked
participants, “Have you changed your ways of using your
smartphone and its applications based on the information
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provided by our system?” Of those who responded to
the voluntary survey, a majority (20/26) indicated that
they found the system useful and changed their habits
related to privacy when using mobile devices. This is in
line with results from Balebako et al. [15], who found
that users “do care about applications that share privacy-
sensitive information with third parties, and would want
more information about data sharing.”
In terms of overhead, we found that a large majority
of users (19/26) observed that battery consumption and
Internet speed were the same better when using ReCon.
While the remaining users observed increased battery
consumption and/or believed their Internet connections
were slower, we do not have sufficient data to validate
whether this was due to ReCon or other factors such
inherent network variations or increased user awareness
of these issues due to our question.
PII leak characterization. We now investigate the PII
leaked in the user study. As Table 6 shows, the most
commonly leaked PII is device identifiers, likely used
by advertising and analytic services. The next most
common leak is location, which typically occurs for apps
that customize their behavior based on user location. We
also find user identifiers commonly being leaked (e.g.,
name and gender), suggesting a deeper level of tracking
than anonymous device identifiers. Depressingly, even in
our small user study we found 171 cases of credentials
being leaked in plaintext (102 verified by users). For
example, the Epocrates iOS app (used by more than
1 million physicians and health professionals) and the
popular dating app Match.com (used by millions, both
Android and iOS were affected) leaked user credentials
in plaintext. Following responsible disclosure principles,
we notified the app developers. The Epocrates app was
fixed as of November, 2015 (and the vulnerability was
made public [6] after we gave them time to reach out
to users to convince them to upgrade), and Match.com
fixed their password exposure in January, 2016 without
notifying us or the public. These results highlight
the negative impact of closed mobile systems—even
basic security is often violated by sending passwords in
plaintext (21 apps in our study).
We further investigate the leaks according to OS
(Table 6).8 We find that the average iOS user in our study
experienced more data leaks than the average Android
user, and particularly experienced higher relative rates of
device identifier, location, and credential leaks.
We investigated the above leaks to identify several
apps responsible for “suspicious” leaks. For example, the
ABC Player app is inferring and transmitting the user’s
gender. Last, All Recipes—a cookbook app—is tracking
8Note that these results are purely observational and we do not
claim any representativeness. However, we did normalize our results
according to the number of users per OS.
Feedback on leaks
Leak Type total correct wrong no label
/unknown
iO
S
Device ID. 3229 12 35 3182
User ID. 655 216 2 437
Contact Info. 6 3 1 2
Location 4836 4751 0 85
Credential 36 30 0 6
A
nd
ro
id
Device ID. 399 2 0 397
User ID. 31 30 0 1
Contact Info. 8 8 0 0
Location 238 227 0 11
Credential 135 72 1 62
Table 6: Summary of leaks predicted by OS. We
observe a higher number of leaks for iOS because the
number of iOS devices (63) is more than the number of
Android devices (33).
user locations even when there is no obvious reason for
it to do so.
7 Related Work
Our work builds upon and complements a series of
related work on privacy and tracking. Early work
focused on tracking via Web browsers [7, 52]. Mobile
devices make significant PII available to apps, and
early studies showed PII such as location, usernames,
passwords and phone numbers were leaked by popular
apps [56]. Several efforts systematically identify PII
leaks from mobile devices, and develop defenses against
them.
Dynamic analysis. One approach, dynamic taint
tracking, modifies the device OS to track access to PII at
runtime [24] using dynamic information flow analysis,
which taints PII as it is copied, mutated and exfiltrated
by apps. This ensures that all access to PII being tracked
by the OS is flagged; however, it can result in large false
positive rates (due to coarse-granularity tainting), false
negatives (e.g., because the OS does not store leaked PII
such as a user’s password), and incur significant runtime
overheads that discourage widespread use. Running
taint tracking today requires rooting the device, which
is typically conducted only by advanced users, and
can void the owner’s warranty. Other approaches that
instrument apps with taint tracking code still either
require modifications to platform libraries [16], and
thus rooting, or resigning the app under analysis [49],
essentially breaking Android’s app update and resource
sharing mechanisms. When taint tracking is performed
as part of an automated analysis environment, user input
generation is crucial to improve coverage of leaks. Tools
such as Dynodroid [46], PUMA [30], and A3E [14]
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automatically generate UI events to explore UI states, but
require manual input for more complex user interactions,
e.g., logging in to sites [20]. Finally, taint tracking does
not address the problem of which PII leaks should be
blocked (and how), a problem that is difficult to address
in practice [33]. Nevertheless, automated dynamic
analysis approaches are complementary to ReCon: as we
demonstrated in §5.3, ReCon can learn from PII leaks
identified through dynamic information flow analysis.
Static analysis. Another approach is to perform static
analysis (e.g., using data flow analysis or symbolic
execution) to determine a priori whether an app will
leak privacy information [12,13,19,23,25,36,38,45,58,
60–62]. This approach can avoid run-time overhead by
performing analysis before code is executed, but state-of-
the-art tools suffer from imprecision [18] and symbolic
execution can be too time-intensive to be practical.
Further, deploying this solution generally requires an
app store to support the analysis, make decisions about
which kinds of leaks are problematic, and work with
developers to address them. Static analysis is also limited
by code obfuscation, and tends not to handle reflection
and dynamically loaded code [63]. A recent study [43]
finds dynamically loaded code is increasingly common,
comprising almost 30% of goodware app code loaded at
runtime.
New execution model. Privacy capsules [32] (PC) are an
OS abstraction that prevent privacy leaks by ensuring that
an app cannot access untrusted devices (e.g., a network
interface) after it accesses private information, unless
the user explicitly authorizes it. The authors show the
approach is low cost and effective for some apps, but it
is currently deployed only as a prototype extension to
Android and requires app modifications for compliance.
Network flow analysis. ReCon analyzes network
flows to identify PII leaks. Previous studies using
network traces gathered inside a mobile network [26,
57], in an ISP [44], and in a lab setting [40]
identified significant tracking, despite not having access
to software instrumentation. In this work, we build on
these observations to both identify how users’ privacy is
violated and control these privacy leaks regardless of the
device OS or network being used.
PrivacyGuard [55], AntMonitor [41] and
HayStack [50] use the Android VPNService to intercept
traffic and perform traffic analysis. A limitation of
these approaches is they rely on hard-coded identifiers
for PII, or require knowledge of a user’s PII to work.
Further, these approaches currently work only for the
Android OS. In contrast, ReCon is cross-platform, does
not require a priori knowledge of PII, and is adaptive to
changes in how PII leaks.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we presented ReCon, a system that
improves visibility and control over privacy leaks in
traffic from mobile devices. We argued that since PII
leaks occur over the network, detecting these leaks at
the network layer admits an immediately deployable and
cross-platform solution to the problem. Our approach
based on machine learning has good accuracy and low
overhead, and adapts to feedback from users and other
sources of ground-truth information.
We believe that this approach opens a new avenue for
research on privacy systems, and provides opportunities
to improve privacy for average users. We are
investigating how to use ReCon to build a system to
provide properties such as k-anonymity, or allow users
to explicitly control how much of their PII is shared
with third parties—potentially doing so in exchange for
micropayments or access to app features.
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